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PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW STATE
INDEPENDENCE
CHARLES E. CLARK
Circuit Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
When with some misgivings I at length accepted sentence to the
bench, I was disturbed by the thought that thereafter I was not
expected to have any opinions except such as the West Publishing
Company might entomb in "the too little-read Federal Reporter.":,
My friends, however, seemingly refused to share my perturbation,
but maintained an annoying air of equanimity, if not downright relief,
at the prospect. But they offered me the solace that I could at least
still talk on procedure, since there was nothing to fight over in that
field and it didn't make much difference how procedural points were
decided anyhow. I did take comfort in that suggestion and hope,
therefore, that it may excuse my presence here. For I could hardly
presume to join a conference dealing with profound problems of
constitutional law to talk merely procedure except on the excuse that
that's either all I know or all I dare talk about. And if you feel
that you are descending from the heights to the depths of the law
or perhaps from the sublime to the ridiculous, please be charitable
and recall the famous saying of a great English judge that rules of
practice are but the handmaid, rather than the mistress, of justice.2
One ought not expect a handmaid to be as fascinating as a mistress.
What I shall hope to do in the course of this brief talk, thus
necessarily barren of opinions or ideas, is to call attention to a few
questions which have developed as a result of the recent federal
emphasis upon application of state law in our system of national
courts. Naturally we must begin with Mr. Tompkins' unfortunate
error in getting tangled up with the Erie Railroad-unfortunate cer-
tainly for himself, if not for us "lower" federal judges., Many com-
mentators have remarked on the anomaly that procedural uniformity
in the federal courts should have been attained at long length at the
very time of this emphatic declaration 'of-complete subservience to
state substantive law. But anomalies .are not unusual in the law,
I The expression is Judge William Clark's in Townsend v. United States, 106
F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), though I understand he and his famous pub-
lishers are in some disagreement whether it should be "the little-read" or "the
too little-read" Federal Reporter.
2 Collins, M. R., in In re Coles [1907] 1 K. B. 1, 4. Cf. Clark, The Handmaid
of Justice (1938) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 297.2 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188(1938).
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especially when they flow out of the initial and basic one implicit in
a federal system-a system wherein two sovereignties, the state and
the national, each operate with kingly force in the same territory
at the same time. Perhaps, indeed, we betray our lack of under-
standing of problems necessarily inherent in our governmental system
by thinking of those recent developments as really presenting an
anomaly; for they are but new angles of, or perhaps only a new
and slightly shifted emphasis on, old problems.
In what I have just said I have probably indicated my own thesis
so adequately that there is little more for me to say. I continue be-
cause I fear that some decisions tend to treat the application of the
Tompkins case to procedural matters, and particularly to the new
federal rules of civil procedure, as a simple matter of using a rather
arbitrary yardstick to test their validity or effect. It apparently comes
to this that, if a federal rule seems to affect the substantial rights of
the parties, or to be an important factor in the outcome of the case,
then ipso facto it must be set aside at once for the state procedure.
It should be added that not all decisions do treat the matter as thus
one of blacks and whites, and that the law reviews have done a dis-
tinct service to the profession and the bench in carefully analyzing
the issues involved.4 Personally I am clear that here we must be
particularly on our guard against hasty and wide-sweeping conclu-
sions, and that for all-embracing categories we must substitute limited
holdings applicable in the main only, to the special circumstances of
particular cases. If we do not do this, I believe we will find our-
selves not only ignoring some of the deeper implications of our
problem as they affect the interrelation of the state and national
courts, but also undermining the recently developed leadership of the
federal courts in procedural reform. Indeed, I venture to make a
plea that we do not give up the gains recently achieved in effective
federal law administration too lightly or except as we are persuaded
that the state interest to which we yield is one of substantial and
immediate worth-is, in truth, more than a mere abstract generality.
Before the Tompkins decision there was no easy general answer to
problems of adjustment of a federal system which must give proper
scope to state law. There isn't now, after the decision. And we
shall not find one by trying to think there is, though we may warp and
restrict the new federal rules in the process.
The immediate issue is formed by asking, What is the effect of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins on the new rules? Of course, an easy
answer, supporting the rules as is, is possible. We may say that the
'The articles and comments are already too numerous for citation; severalare referred to below.
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decision only requires the federal courts to follow state law in mat-
ters of substantive right, and since the Court has authoritatively
declared matters included in the new rules to be procedural by the
mere fact of such inclusion,5 there's an end of the matter. But gen-
eral rules have always been subject to test in litigation between par-
ties, and, as the cases already show,6 these rules cannot expect any
other fate. Moreover, they will be subject to interpretation, and
restrictions set upon them in the course of interpretation may be as
serious as outright disaffirmance.7
Before considering more in detail some of the questions raised by
the Tompkins case with respect to various of the rules, perhaps we
may pause for a moment to consider what is the effect of this deci-
sion outside its effect on the rules. I mention the question because
I have heard the thesis advanced that its substantial results are
largely limited to those which may be found with respect to the pro-
cedural rules. This thesis is supported by argument that the central
principle of the case was being followed in substantial effect in the
federal courts before its pronouncement by the Court. Now this
argument must not be too broadly stated, for we know that cases
presenting the issue were recurringly appearing on the docket of the
Court. I need to recall that the Tompkins case itself was a reversal
of my own court.8 And my own judicial experience has been too
brief to justify too confident conclusions. All I can say is that
though hardly a case is now so friendless that appealing counsel
does not eventually call upon this decision for support, yet day after
day we are forced of necessity to apply state law in all the large
volume of commercial litigation we have before us, particularly that
resulting from the bankruptcy jurisdiction, and we could not do any-
5 In the light of the limitations of the enabling act of June 19, 1934, c. 651, 48
Stat. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §§ 723b, 723c (1934), and the stated purpose ofthe rules to govern procedure, Rules 1 and 82, with the Advisory Committee's
notes thereto.6 Compare the recent ruling in Melekov v. Collins, 30 F. Supp. 159 (S. D.
Cal. 1939), that Rule 4(f) for service of process anywhere in the state is in-
valid. And compare criticism in Commentary (1939) 2 FED. RULES SERV. 4f.21 and in (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 883. See Schwarz v. Artcraft Silk HosieryMills, Inc., 110 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). The validity of Rule 35(a)for compulsory physical or mental examination of a party has been sustained
against attack in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 108 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 7th,1939), but certiorari has been prayed for. [Certiorari was granted by theSupreme Court on April 8, 1940, two days after Judge Clark's address.-ED.]
7 In Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E. D. Ill. 1938), it was said thateven if the state rule of burden of proof of contributory negligence must pre-
vail, yet the federal rule of pleading under 8(c) might still have its own lim-ited scope. And in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754, 757 (C. C. A. 1st,
1940), Judge Magruder suggests that the Supreme Court might have adopted a
rule of burden of proof which would have been valid and conclusive of the caseat bar, but Rule 8(c) was one only "of pleading."
8 Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 90 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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thing else even had Tompkins never gotten in the way of the Erie
train. With us the bulk of litigation, outside such purely federal
topics as patent or admiralty law, concerns transactions occurring in
New York. Hence we find ourselves steadily applying the New York
law of fraudulent conveyances, registration of chattel mortgages, trust
receipts, stock corporations, and so on and so forth-in a large num-
ber of instances even before the New York courts have themselves
announced the law.9 A large share of these matters turns on New
York statutes; as to many, we would be hard put to it, to find a
"federal law" on them. It would be unthinkable to apply other than
New York law, and I can now recall not a single instance -where the
point would seem even doubtful.1"
Let me say with emphasis that I regard this trend not only as
natural and inevitable, but also as most desirable. It would indeed
be a reproach on our law if a litigant could obtain some advantage
in fundamental rights through the mere chance that he was entitled
to sue in the federal courts. The very need of consistency and im-
partiality in our law calls for the application of the Tompkins d;c-
trine. Even though that result might be forthcoming in any event,"
the impetus given by the Court's pronouncement desirably accelerated
the trend. Granting all that, we may still say also that uniform and
simple federal procedure represents an outstanding gain which should
not be lightly cast aside. The new federal rules constituted a reform
made by lawyers for lawyers. Its success to date has been literally
phenomenal. The ease with which both attorneys and judges have
adjusted themselves to the changes and the zeal with which they have
taken advantage of the new developments surpass anything which has
happened before. Usually a long period of adjustment, of pain and
indecision, has followed any major reform of practice. Not so in
the present instance. Indeed, two commentators, after referring to
the use made of the discovery procedure by practitioners, remark
further that "remarkably enough, the judges, casting off the old
shackles, have applied the new scope of examination almost literally.
Federal discovery is in operation." 12 There is hardly a breath of
dissent."
9 Cf., e. g., Sammet v. Mayer, 108 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) ; Barr &
Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F. (2d) 924 (C. C. A. 2d,1940).
10 Cf., A. L. C., The Common Law of the United States (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
1351.
11 McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal
Courts (1938) 33 ILL. L. Rav. 126.
12 Pike and Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation (1940) 7 U. oF Cl. L.Rv. 297, 327.
'. That my old friend Professor McCaskill is pleading so longingly for the
halcyon days of the common law in .Tury Demands in the New Federal Pro-
8
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Now we can emphasize the point that procedure is only a means
to an end, that of achieving substantive justice, not an end in itself,14
and yet find values in it. That a case may progress steadily and
expeditiously to its rational conclusion without mistakes at best waste-
ful of time and money, at worst preventing a just adjudication, is
of the utmost importance to the litigants. But the two parties to a
case are not the only ones interested. All other litigants whose cases
may be delayed by gluts in the court calendar, and the public which
bears the ultimate cost of litigations, are most directly interested.
Until, therefore, we are shown that a specific state policy of sub-
stance is being thwarted, I submit that we should follow the carefully
formulated principles of the new procedure.
We are justified in taking this position because no abstract and
formal differentiation between substance and procedure is possible.
In fact almost any borderline case will necessarily present elements
both substantive and procedural in nature. A wise teacher pointed
this out some years ago with particular reference to a field where this
problem had already caused much difficulty. In his famous article,
" 'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 15 Professor
Walter Wheeler Cook demonstrated that no arbitrary line between
the two concepts was possible, since the decisions treated the same
matter at times as one, at times as the other, of the two, as the pur-
poses for which definition is made may vary. The problem, then, is
not one of discovering the location of a pre xisting "line," but of
deciding where on sound principles of policy a line shall be drawn.
And this involves the delicate task of balancing interests, which is
the way problems of federal and state adjustment have been met from
the beginning and which is the essence of the judicial process.
If, on the other hand, we try to say that anything possessing an
element of substantive law is beyond the federal rules, the result is
staggering. The number of the federal rules about which such issue
may be raised is indeed large. Thus, with respect to the very first
two rules, wherein the fundamental reform of the union of law and
equity is set forth, it might be argued that a litigant who could rely
on a bare legal right until he could be forced before a court of equity
has something of substantive value to himself, at the very least of
nuisance value. We may perhaps recall that there were the state
cedure (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 315 (where he finds I am guilty of a new
crime or disease--"mergeritis"), seems to me, by the very nostalgia of the plea,
to accentuate the fact that the new procedure is working. Cf., Pike and Fischer,
Pleadings and Jury Rights it the New Federal Procedure (1940) 88 U. oF Pa.
L. REv. 645.
14 Supra note 2.
15 (1933) 42 YaE L. J. 333, 336.
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court decisions, now for the most part forgotten, which even held
that a litigant in an equity case had a constitutional right to a trial
by a chancellor, not a jury.16 Then Rule 3, dealing with the com-
mencement of suit by the filing of a complaint with the clerk, may
affect the time of running of state statutes of limitation.17 Perhaps
we may skip over the rules providing for a simple system of pleading
the ultimate facts, though the New York lawyers certainly seem to
think that particularization on motion, separate statement, and the
whole hierarchy of pleading objections familiar in state practice
should be theirs to use in the federal courts.'8 But we shall have
to pause when we come to rules dealing with the burden of pleading
and proving particular issues, for they raise the whole question.
They are the stock examples to which every one turns for illustra-
tion of the problem.
Rule 8(c), following precedents in England, Connecticut, and New
York, which have shown the usefulness of definite rules as to the
duty to plead certain oft-recurring defenses, provides that a party
must affirmatively set forth certain defenses there listed. Those in-
clude such defenses as accord and satisfaction, payment, release, the
statute of limitations, and the statute of frauds. Included among
these is contributory negligence. The rule does not in terms refer to
the burden of proof, but it is usual, though not invariable, for the
burden of proof to accord with the burden of pleading.' 9 In general,
the two rules are settled by like principles which turn upon considera-
tions of fairness and equity as to who should advance and support
the issue if it is to be presented at all.
Now the rule adopted in probably the greater number of states
has been that the burden of both pleading and proving the contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff has been upon the defendant, and this
has been the settled rule of the federal courts.2" Indeed, the leading
case of Central Vermont Ry. v. White,2 held that this rule should
16 Compare such a case as Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274,
42 N. W. 827 (1889), with Brown v. Greer, 16 Ariz. 215, 141 Pac. 841 (1914);
and see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 60-61.
'V (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 1087; 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 238-
256.Is I have discussed this point of view elsewhere. See Clark, The Bar and the
Recent Reform of Federal Procedure (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 22; PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NEW YORK SYMPOSIUTM ON THE FEDERAL RULEs (1938) 240, 243; see also
Pike, Objections to Pleadings under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1937) 47 YALE L. J. 50, 62-65.
1 9 The issue of payments seems to be the only substantial variation. CLARK,
CODE PLEADING (1928) 195-196, 417-419.
20 CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 209-210; Tunks, Categorization and Fed-
eralism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1939)
34 IL. L. REv. 271-273.21238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865, 59 L. ed. 1433 (1915).
1236 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
be applied in Vermont in a case under the Federal Employers Lia-
bility Act in preference to the state rule, since a plaintiff had a right
to such a course, which was more than procedural and was substan-
tive under that Act. And the case now is perhaps the most freely
cited precedent against federal uniformity on proving contributory
negligence.
The problem under the Tompkins case is acute because a number
of important and populous states have the rule which places the
burden of showing freedom from contributory negligence upon the
plaintiff. These include the state of New York, except in death cases,
and the state of Illinois. A federal court sitting in Illinois has already
ruled that in an action there governed by Illinois law, the burden of
proof of lack of contributory negligence is upon the plaintiff-a
decision which has been widely cited, but which, as I say with all
deference, seems to me to leave some stones not overturned and
therefore not to constitute the final word on the subject.2 Other
decisions are rather conflicting, and commentators have presented a
variety of points of view. 3 Recently Judge Hincks has been called
upon to rule on this question in the light of Connecticut law, and
since this law, in my opinion, presents a real laboratory case for
consideration, or perhaps experimentation, I may be pardoned for
examining it with some care.
In Connecticut the historic rule has been that in a negligence action
the plaintiff, in proving that the defendant was the proximate cause
of his injury, must show that he himself is free from negligence.
Under this analysis an allegation charging defendant with negligence
said in effect that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause
of the injury, thus excluding any contributory negligence of the
plaintiff, and no other allegation was necessary. 4 Nevertheless the
lawyers, who doubtless had purchased and read pleading form books,
came often to include the unnecessary allegation that the plaintiff
was in the exercise of due care at the time of the accident. You will
soon see how this striving for perfection by the lawyers became their
undoing. There came a case where the defendant autoist succeeded
in killing his victim and thus destroyed the only eye-witness to the
accident other than himself. Naturally the administrator in bring-
ing suit for wrongful death was unable to show that his intestate
22 Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill. 1938).
23 Schopp v. Muller Dairies, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. N. Y. 1938). Cf.,
Bridges v. Dahl, 108 F. (2d) 228 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) ; and see Tunks, supra
note 20; (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 1472, 1478; (1939) 27 GEO. L. J. 375; (1939)
27 ILL. B. J. 310; (1939) 34 ILL L. REv. 106; (1939) 24 IowA L. REv. 609;
(1939) 6 U. OF CIm. L. REv. 510; (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 344.
24 See discussion in (1935) 9 CONx. B. J. 282-297; (1923) 32 YALE L. 3. 483.
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was in the exercise of due care. He was therefore non-suited, and
on appeal the decision was affirmed, though Chief Justice Wheeler
wrote a stirring dissent condemning the backwardness and harshness
of the ruling.2 5 That was in 1930. In 1931, the legislature had
responded to the demand for change by providing that in death cases
the burden of this issue should be on the defendant.2 6
One might think that this substantial reform had been accomplished
and questions about it put at rest. Nevertheless shortly thereafter
in a death case the lawyer made the unnecessary allegation that his
intestate was in the exercise of due care. The court took him at his
word and charged directly contrary to the statute on the ground that
the plaintiff had assumed the burden of proof of due care by plead-
ing it. That decision was upheld by the supreme court of our state,
on the ground of invited error, that is, that the plaintiff had invited
the error which the trial court had committed.2 7  The present dis-
tinguished Chief Justice took me to task for venturing some criticism
of the case, pointing out that it was the theoretical and professorial
point of view which led me to do so.28  Now that I have become a
judge I can confess to more sympathy with the view which endeavors
to sustain a trial court's ruling during a long and hard-fought case.
I still wonder, however, whether the state's policy solemnly declared
by the legislature had not been somewhat lightly set aside because
of a lawyer's mistake in pleading not wisely, but too well.
At any rate, in the light of this history, can we say that the burden
of proof of contributory negligence in non-death cases is so vital a
state policy that it overrides the federal rule? This would be anom-
alous when the state supreme court holds that even a declaration by
the legislature on the subject may be set aside by the parties them-
selves. It has said further that the statue is "procedural in its char-
acter rather than one affecting substantive rights" and merely raises a
presumption of due care, shifting the burden of proof; hence it ap-
plies to pending actions.2 9 Judge Hincks said that when the court
of last resort of the state had held that the burden of proof of con-
tributory negligence was no part of the substantive law of the state,
25 Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. 86, 151 Atl. 433 (1930). Cf., (1931) 40 YAIE
L. J. 484.
26 Conn. Gen. Stat. Supp. § 1654c (1931).
27 Hatch v. Merigold, 119 Conn. 339, 176 Atl. 266 (1935). Cf., Effect of Un-
necessary Afirmative Pleading upon the Burden of Proof (1929) 39 YAU L. J.117.
28 (1935) 9 CONN. B. J. 282, 290.
29 Toletti v. Bidizcki, 118 Conn. 531, 537, 173 At. 223 (1934). See the sim-
ilar statement of Circuit judge William Clark in Guardian Life Ins. Co. v.Clum, 106 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), quoted in (1939) 25 A. B. A. J.
1068.
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the Tompkins case required him to treat the matter as one of pro-
cedure and follow Rule 8(c) in a non-death case.30 And who with
this background is willing to attack that result? As a matter of fact,
a law review commentator urged that very result for New York
cases, on the ground that the New York state courts had held the
issue procedural.3 1
The final chapter in the Connecticut story needs to be stated, for
the Connecticut legislature, always obliging to its litigants and its
judges, has just amended its statute again to place the burden of con-
tributory negligence on the defendant in all cases, whether of death
or of personal injury or property damage.3 2 That is the one solution
which can confidently be recommended to everybody.
I suggest again that this shows that a rule, which obviously has
some effect upon substantive rights and just as obviously has to do
with the manner in which the case is brought before and presented
to the courts, does affect both substance and procedure, and that we
cannot decide in which category it must go for present purposes
without weighing other matters of policy. May it not be sound to
do as judge Hincks has done and to try to ascertain how strongly
substantive the rule is regarded in the state itself, by its legislature
and courts? This will not be an easy task, leading always to a clear-
cut conclusion, but it is one which does give proper value to the
conflicting interests here present.
The complications of this problem can be increased by asking, if
any state law governs, which one it is. That is a question which is
going to obtrude itself quite often on the courts. For negligence cases
usually are in the federal courts only because the parties are citizens
of different states and hence very often the accident will have hap-
pened in a state other than the one wherein the federal court is
actually sitting. Under the present state of district court law,
what would be the answer if a Connecticut defendant is sued in the
District Court of Connecticut for an accident occurring in Illinois?
In the Connecticut district the burden of proving contributory negli-
gence is procedural; in Illinois it is not. The issue may be varied
by stating the converse situation or in other details, but I am quite
sure you can picture those variations without my help and have an
answer ready at hand for each situation.33 Let me suggest again the
S3 MacDonald v. Central Vt. Ry., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 298 (D. C. Conn. 1940).
31 (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 344.
32 Conn. Gen. Stat. Supp. § 1399e (1939).
33 See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940). See also
Pike and Fischer, What Law Governs Matters of "Substance" in Federal Prac-
tice (1939) 2 FED. RULES SERV. 1.3; and Tunks, supra note 20. In Sampson v.
Channell, Judge Magruder refers to the fact that the state courts have generally
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thought I have offered that, unless the state policy is clear and
compelling, there would seem to me no reason for rejecting the fed-
eral rule. In other words, the burden should be on the party who
asks its disaffirmance to demonstrate that state policy so requires.
But, before I leave this subject, I feel that with some fear and
trepidation I must turn to consideration of the Supreme Court's own
most recent pronouncement on the matter of burden of proof. It
has been thought that in the case of Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,
decided last December, 4 the Court has put these matters at rest by
holding the matter of burden of proof to be one of substance. Now
I presume that in the short time I have been on the bench I have
as high record of error as any judge, and I am therefore almost
predisposed to error here. Nevertheless I do not believe that is so,
even though the Court supported its decision by saying that Central
Vermont Ry. v. White3 5 "considered an analogous situation and
pointed out the principle presently applicable." For it seems to me
the same problem arises which I have stressed above, namely, How
seriously did the state courts view the particular issue, which was
that of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of land? The
court below admitted that the state law as to this burden was dif-
ferent from that applied by the trial court, but relied on the excep-
tional character of the state law and the fact that the rule of the
federal courts and of most of the states was otherwise.86 This was
not a proper basis for disregarding the state rule, and the Supreme
Court, taking the circuit court at its word as to what the state rule
was, therefore reversed.
Now I wonder if an actual exploration of the state law might not
have dredged up some of the points I have referred to as presented
by the Connecticut doctrine of contributory negligence. The state in
question was Texas. I do not want to be dogmatic about the matter,
for I cannot pretend to have made a complete analysis of Texas
decisions, and I refer to the point only by way of example. But it
held rules allocating the burden of proof of contributory negligence to be pro-
cedural in nature, but he then says that the result must be otherwise in the fed-
eral courts under the Tompkins doctrine. Nevertheless his actual decision is in
accord with the views of the state courts and supports the arguments set forth
in the text, for it places the burden on the defendant, contrary to the law
of Maine, where the accident sued on occurred. This result was reached
because the action was tried in the federal court in Massachusetts, and the
supreme judicial court of that state insists that the rule is procedural and the
burden must be on the defendant, even though the law of the place of the acci-
dent may be otherwise. Judge Wilson concurred in the result only; Judge
Peters dissented.
a4308 U. S. 208, 60 Sup. Ct. 201, 84 L. ed. (adv. op.) 185 (1939), noted
(1940) 8 GEo. WAsH. L. RzV. 860 and (1940) 26 VA. L. Rgv. 375,
35 Supra note 21.
36101 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
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is my impression that Texas also holds to the doctrine of invited
error and that unnecessary pleading- may lead to assumption of a
burden of proof not otherwise resting upon the pleader. Certainly I
do not see how the case of Boswell v. Pannell,37 decided 'by the Su-
preme Court of Texas in 1915, is to be otherwise explained, for it
appears to me to hold that defendant had pleaded himself into the
burden of proving himself an innocent purchaser for value. The court
points out that the defendant had the benefit of this affirmation be-
fore the jury, which may have been a distinct help to him. And this
is the same issue which was in the Dunlap case. Perhaps the Texas
court views the issue no more seriously than does the Connecticut
court that of contributory negligence.
The Dunlap case, with certain variations, might be made to pre-
sent other aspects of the same problem. There complainant sued to
quiet title to a strip of oil land, relying on a chain of title wherein
was a deed conveying the land in question if the bounds, but not the
distances, cited in it prevailed. Defendant relied on a chain of title
where the distance stated in this deed would govern, to wit, 440
yards, instead of 506 yards. Could defendant have raised substan-
tially the issue he desired by a simple denial, and then reliance on
proof of the facts and circumstances under which the deed was given
as 'explaining its meaning? At any rate, he did not try to do so,
but pleaded that the bounds stated in the deed were inserted therein
by mistake and inadvertence. Complainant replied simply that it was
a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. These were all the
pleadings, on the basis of which the district court held that com-:
plainant had the burden of proof of its innocence, to be now reversed
by the Supreme Court. I refer to this matter only to suggest that
the way a case is pleaded often will go far to determine the way it
must be presented at trial. That is particularly true in view of the
union of law and equity. Matters which in the old days required a
separate bill of reformation now at most come in as an equitable
defense in the answer, and it may be possible to squeeze them into
a mere denial. 8 How far do such vagaries in pleading, inevitable
under a fairly simple and unregulated system of allegation, go to
determine our substantive rules? I do not regard it as particularly
desirable that a court should adjust its rules of burden' of proof
and presumption to the way the parties plead, but I wonder if to a
certain extent it is not inevitable. At any rate, without necessarily
going that far, we can have these possibilities in mind in weighing
37 107 Tex. 433, 180 S. W. 593 (1915). Cf. also (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. Rv.482, 483.
8 Cf., Clark, Trial of Actions under the Code (1926) 11 CoRx. L. Q. 482.
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whether a federal rule regulating the procedural steps is to be not
followed.
I wish there were time to discuss other matters concerning other
federal rules left perhaps more or less in doubt by the Tompkins
case. I can refer to only one more, a most interesting one indeed,
as it seems to me. One would think that the rules for free amend-
ment of pleadings, having had such a long basis in procedural reform
generally and in the federal statutes themselves, would now be be-
yond the realm of permissible doubt. Yet a distinguished circuit
court of appeals has already ruled that Rule 151(c), providing that,
when the claim asserted in the amended pleading arises out of "the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence" set forth in the original plead-
ing, the amendment shall relate back to the date of the original
pleading, does not apply when state decisions have said that two or
more different causes of action arise out of a single transaction or
occurrence.89 The matter there under consideration was one involving
different claims for wrongful death. This decision, too, may be far-
reaching, not merely because it goes against what seemed to be fairly
well settled rules of amendment, but also because it brings back into
the new federal rules the concept of cause of action,40 which had
been definitely outlawed in favor of emphasis upon not the legal
right, but the occurrence or transaction which might give rise to
various legal rights. The implications of the decision may be rather
serious if it cannot be confined rather strictly to its facts as based
upon a particular Oklahoma statute as defined and construed by the
courts of that state.
I recall that Messrs. Frankfurter and Landis, in their well-known
essay on "The Business of the Supreme Court," stated that from the
beginning of our government in 1789 until the time when they wrote
controversy had been continuous and prolonged as to the proper
orbit of federal and state action. I dare say that the two partners-
and particularly the senior member as justice of the Supreme Court
-have had occasion to see the continuance of this issue even to the
present moment. For one I do not look for any complete adjust-
ment of the problems of which I have spoken. As you can see,
instead I shudder at the prospect of any attempt at finality. I sug-
gest once more that in mere matters of getting things done in courts,
as well as elsewhere, we achieve more if we can round off all sharp
39 L. E. Whitham Construction Co. v. Remer, 105 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 10th,
1939), criticized in (1940) 34 ILL. L. Rav. 765 and in Pike and Fischer, Rela-
tion; Back of Anmendments to Pleadings after Statute of Limitations Has Run
(1939) 2 FaD. RuIfas SERV. 15c.1.
4o See Collins v. Merto-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106'F. (2d) 83, 86 (C. C. A.2d, 1939) ; Elliott v. Mosgrove, 162 Ore. 540, 93 P. (2d) 1070 (1939).
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points and if we can allow for considerable play in the joints of our
machine. If in fact we are bound by matters of constitutional right
on these problems, I fear we shall just about be compelled to give
up hopes of achieving any degree of procedural efficiency. If, how-
ever, we have here, as I believe, only a question of practical ways
and means to reach expeditiously fair and just results between par-
ties litigant, then I expect we will continue to get along adjusting
these issues of state and national policy in much the same way as
we have done these many years.
